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THE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPERATED
THE MOTEL HE HAD MADE AN AVERAGE
NET INCOME OF $3,000.00 PER MONTH;
THAT THIS REPRESENTATION WAS A MATERIAL REURESENTATION."
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

MARVIN PETERSEN and BEVERLY
PETERSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

-vs-

Case No.
10,113

VOYL MECHAM,
Defendant and Appellant:

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintlffs, Marvin Petersen c-1nd Beverly Petersen, for rescision of a warranty
deed and reconveyance of realty situated in the State
of Wyoming, which was given to the defendantappellant in exchange for an interest in seller's proceeds from a contract for sale of property in Idaho,
based upon certain misrepresentations alleged to
have been made by the appellant in order to induce
the respondents to enter into the exchange.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Co·urt sitting without
a. jury, and plaintiffs were awarded judgment, cancelling· and rescinding a contract entered into by the
plaintiffs and defendant, rescinding a warranty
deed given by the plaintiffs to the defendant, and an
order was entered against the defendant to reconvey the land in question to the plaintiffs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant appeals from the judgment and
decree of the lower court on the ground that the
record does not support the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered therein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or prior to October 1, 1962, Marvin Petersen
and Beverly Petersen, his wife {plaintiffs herein)
entered into a Listing Agreement with one Glen
Van Tasse·ll who was acting as salesman for Duffin
Realty Company, wherein the Petersons authorized
Van Tassell to secure a purchaser of their ranch
property situated in Wyoming. At the same time,
Voyl Mecham (defendant herein) was the contract
purchaser of a motel situated in Arco, Idaho.
Sometime prior to December 15, 1962, defendant
Mecham entered into a Listing Agreement with Duffjn Realty, which authorized Duffin Realty to secure
o. purchaser of his interest in the motel property in
Arco, Idaho. Thereafter, Glen Van Tassell, acting as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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salesman for Duffin Realty produced a buyer for
the motel owned by defendant Mecham, and on December 15, 1962 defendant Mecham signed an agreement with one Zola B. Beebe, wherein Mrs. Beebe
agreed to purchase the said motel. This agreement
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-1 (R 36).
Pursuant to the terms of this agreement Mrs. Beebe
agreed to buy Mecham's equity in the said motel in
the amount of $46,096.92, which was payable at the
r1te of $300.00 per month, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 5% per annum, commencing
February 1, 1963. Thereafter, five days later, on
December 20, 1962, through the efforts of the same
Glen Van Tassell, plaintiffs Marvin and Beverly
Petersen and defendant Voyl Mecham entered into
an agreement (which was introduced in evidence
as Exhibit P-3 (R 40) pursuant to the terms of which
defendant Mecham conveyed to the Petersens
59.38% of his eauity jn the agreement of sale with
Mrs. Zola B. Beebe (Exhibit P-1) in exchange for the
conveyance of the Petersens' interest in the ranch
nroperty situated in the State of \t\T-yoming, which
the parties agreed was worth $27,373.32.
The agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Petersen
and Mr. Mecham specified that a copy of the Beebe
contract was attached thereto and that Mecham was
assigning to the Petersens 59.38% thereof, together
with the same percentage of the monthly payments
due from Mrs. Beebe, without recourse against
Mecham in the event of default by Mrs. Beebe.
In paragraph 6 of the same agreement, Mr. and
~.~rs. Petersen agreed to hold Mr. Mecham harmless
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from th.e default by Zola B. Beebe vf the terms of her
agreement of purchase (R 44).
Thereafter, Mrs. Beebe defaulted in her payments required to be made under contract (Exhibit
P-1) and on April 8, 1963, Mr. and Mrs. Petersen
commenced action for recision of the agreement entered into between Mr. and Mrs. Petersen and Mr.
Mecham and for re-conveyance of the Wyoming
rancl1 property which had been conveyed to Mr.
Mecham.
At the triaL Mr. and Mrs. Petersen appeared
and testified that Van Tassell had represented to
them that the motel was earning an average of $3,000.00 per month. They further testified that Van
Tassell represented to them that he was personally
acquainted with Mrs. Beebe (R 76, 88, 89, 90), that
she was an honest woman, an able motel manager,
and that she would make the payments to the Petersens (R 88). Mrs. Petersen further testified that she
and her husband made no effort to check the credit
or character of Mrs. Beebe (R 88).
Plaintiffs also produced as a witness Glen Van
TasselL the salesman who had arranged all of the
foregoing transactions. He testified, among other
things, that Mecham had represented to him that
the motel "had made him $3000.00 per month and
that he had books to prove it" (R 32, 33). At the request of Van Tassell, Mr. Mecham delivered his
books on the operation of the Arco motel to Mr.
Van Tassell. These records were subsequently introduced in evidence as Exhibit D-6 (R 105). The
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office girl at the Duffin Realty Company transcribed
these records, and her typed copy was introduced
in evidence as Exhibit P-4 (R 44 and R 94).
Mr. Mecham also appeared as a witness in his
own behalf and among other things denied that
he h~d represented to Mr. Van Tassell or anyone
else that the motel had an income of $3,000 per
month. He said, "I told him at one time it took in as
mucr! as, a little over $3,000.00 in one month" (R 78).

The uncontroverted evidence also indicates that
Van Tassell was instrumental in procuring the
breach of contract by Mrs. Zola B. Beebe (R 104).
The evidence further shows that, subsequent to
the breach of the agreement to purchase the motel
in Area, Idaho, by Mrs. Beebe, the holders of underlying liens on the motel proceeded to foreclose their
claims against the motel by repossession (R 104) and
that the Petersens refused to contribute the sums
necessary to save the motel, although Mr. Petersen
admitted that he knew that he should have stood toqether with Mr. Mecham to protect Mecham's equity
in th~ motel but that failed he to do so (R 74).
At the time of the trial hereof the motel in Idaho
had been repossessed and the interest of both
Petersen and Mecham had been lost thereby.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT E'R RED IN FINDING
"THAT TO INDUCE THE PLAINTIFFS TO ENTER
INTO SAID WRITTEN AGREEMENT THE DEFENDANT REPRESENTED [TO PLAINTIFFS] THAT
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DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPERATED THE MOTEL HE HAD MADE AN AVERAGE NET
INCOME OF $3,000.00 PER MONTH: THAT THIS
REPRESENTATION WAS A MATERIAL REPRESENTATION."
POINT· II: THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED
Il'J FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS .WERE
READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO CANCEL AND
TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
POINT III: THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY
BY THE PLAINTIFFS SHOWS THAT THEY ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT WITH THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS
BY VAN TASSELL WITH RESPEC1' TO MRS. BEEBE
A.ND NOT BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS
AS TO INCOME.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
"THA 1~ TO INDUCE THE PLAINTIFFS TO ENTER
INTO SAID WRITTEN AGREEMENT THE DEFENDANT REPRESENTED [TO PLAINTIFFS] THAT
DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPERATED THE MOTEL HE HAD MADE AN AVERAGE NET
INCOME OF $3,000.00 PER MONTH: THAT THIS
REPRESENTATION WAS A MATERIAL REPRESENTATION.~'

Defendant submits that the Court erred in Finding of Fact No. 3 in two particulars:
1) In finding that defendant made any representations at all to plaintiffs; and
2) In finding that the alleged misrepresentation
was material.
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These points will be argued in the above order.
1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT MADE ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS AT
ALL TO PLAINTIFFS-In the Findings of Fact signed
by the Court, Finding No. 3 contains a finding that
"... defendant represented that during the period
of time he had operated the motel he had made an
average net income of $3,000.00 per month . . . . "
(R 15). This finding is vague as to whom defendant
made this alleged representation; however, in the
Memorandum Decision filed by the trial court in
this m.atter, which was later amplified by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial judge
clearly specified to whom he found the alleged misrepresentations were made. The Memorandum Decision says in part:
"1. That it appears from the clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant HIMSELF made representations TO THE PLAINTIF'F'S and to others
which were false .... " (R 14). (Emphasis added.)

The Memorandum Decision further states:
". . . Whether Van Tassell himself made any false
representations, or was an agent of one or the other
or both of the parties, would have no bearing in this
case" (R 14).

Defendant respectfully submits that the Court's
finding that defendant HIMSELF made the alleged
representations TO PLAINTIFFS, finds no support
in the evidence. The clear and uncontroverted testimony, even of plaintiffs themselves, was to the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

strary. Mr. Petersen testifie-d that he did not have any
dealings with Mr. Mecham, nor did he talk with
Mr. Mecham as to the earnings of the motel (R 65),
and both plaintiffs admitted that they had not even
met Mr. Mecham until after their contract with him
was sig-ned (R 74). Thus, it is clear from the record
that the defendant himself did not in fact make any
representations to the plaintiffs.
Defendant concurs with the findings of the trial
court that whether or not Van Tassell made any false
representations would have no bearing in this case.
This appears from the fact that Van Tassell was the
listing agent for both parties, and thus, his representations are not chargeable to the defendant any
more than they are chargeable to plaintiffs.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION WAS MATERIAL - Defendant, in his testimony and continu_ously since the inception of this matter, has denied tha_t he made any representation to anyone that
the rnotel h-3d an average net income of $3,000.00
per month. Since this is a suit in equity, the court
has the d.uty to review both questions of law and
fact. RUBEY vs. WOOD, 13 Utah 2d 285, 373 P.2d
386 (1962). Ne-vertheless, even conceding, for the
sake of the argument and without admitting that
defendant did make such a representation, defen.dant asserts that the representation was not actionable since it was not material to the subject of
the contract which plaintiffs seek to rescind. It
should be borne in mind that plaintiffs were no1
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purchasing an interest in the motel in Area, Idaho,
nor were they purchasing an interest in the income
from the motel. The contracts which were introduced in evidence clearly indicate that on December 15, 1962 defendant sold the motel to MRS. ZOLA
BEEBE and that five days later on December 20, 1962,
nlaintiffs purchased part of defendant's interest in
the Beebe contract. Thus the plaintiffs acquired no
interest in the motel or its income, but only an account r2~eivable from Mrs. Zola Beebe. The contract
between plaintiffs and defendant specifies that the
plajntiffs were buying 59.38% of Mecham's "equity
in the attached agreement of purchase." The Beebe
contra.ct was attached to the agreement between
nl ~in tiffs and defendant and by its terms indicated
that the only thing moving to the seller thereunder
(defendant Mecham) was the right to receive $300.00
Der month from 11rs. Zola Beebe. Accordingly, the
propert}7 purchased by plaintiffs was merely a por:~on of the defendant's interest in the contract bet\veen defendant and Mrs. Beebe, and not the motel
or its income.
One of the fundamental principles of the law
relating to misrepresentation and the maintenance
o£ actions based thereon is, that in order to be actionable the facts misrepresented_ must have been
r::aterial facts. These facts must substantially affect
the interest of the persons asserting the misrepresent:::t:.:)r-,. From the facts of this case it will readily be
seen that no facts were misrepresented or even
nlleged to be misrepresented_ with respect to the
Eeebe contra.ct, which was the only thing in which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiffs purchased an interest. "In order to fall
within the requisites of materiality essential to predication of fraud on their existence/ representations
must be RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT OF A CONTRACT and must be as to some SUBJECT MATERIAL
TO THE CONTRACT ITSELF, as distinguished from
matters which are merely collateral thereto and do
not constituJe essential elements thereof. FOR EXAMPLE/ IT Hi\S BEEN I-IELD THAT REPRESENTATIONS WHICH MERELY AFFECT THE PROBABILITY THAT THE CONTRACT WILL BE PERFORMED
ARE COLL.A_TERAL TO IT AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE ACTIONABLE FRAUD." (23 Am. Jur. Fraud
and Deceit/ Section 113) Emphasis added.)
1

Defendant respectfully submits that the statements alleged to have been misrepresented were
representations as to collateral matters (the income
of the motel during the six months it was operated
by J\1echam) a.nd were not material to the subject
matter of the contract between plaintiffs and defendant (the payments to be received from the Beebe
contract).
It is submitted that inasmuch as plaintiffs were
purchasing only the right to receive $178.14 per
month from Zola Beebe, the real .3ubject of inquiry
by plaintiffs should be the character of Zola Beebe
and her disposition for paying her debts. Yet the
re':ord shows, from the admissions of plaintiffs themselves . that plaintiffs made no attempt to investigate
Zola Beebe and that they relied upon the representations of Van Tassell that HE WAS PERSONALLY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
ACQUAINTED WITH MRS. BEEBE, THAT SHE WAS
AN HONEST WOMAN, AN ABLE MOTEL MANAGER, AND THAT SHE WOULD MAKE THE PAYMENTS TO THE PETERSENS (R 88). There is no
hint in the record that any of these representations
were made with the knowledge or approval of defendant. In fact, the uncontroverted testimony also
shows that defendant was was not personally acquainted with Zola Beebe and did not know her
character himself (R 89, 90).
It should also be noted that the precise fact alleged to be misrepresented was that while DEFENDANT operated the motel HE made an average
net income of $3,000.00 per month. This would
have no bearing on whatever income might be derived from the motel BY ZOLA BEEBE. Inasmuch
as the contract documents (Exhibits P-1 and P-3) on
their face indicated that Mrs. Beebe had purchased
the motel from Mr. Mecham only five (5) days prior
to the time that plaintiffs purchased their interest in
the Beebe Contract from Mr. Mecham, plaintiffs
were charged with the knowledge that Mrs. Beebe
was a new operator of this motel and they would
have no right to rely on any representations made to
therrl with respect to the operation of the motel by
defendant or anyone else, other than Mrs. Zola
Beebe.

In the case of LEWIS v. WHITE, 2 Utah 2d 101,
269 P.2d 865 (1 954), this court held:
"No matter how naive or inexperienced the defendants were, they could not close their eyes and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accept unquestioningly any representations made to
them. IT WAS THEIR DUTY TO MAKE SUCH
INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY as reasonable
care under the circumstances would dictate. . . ."
(Emphasis added).

Yet the record clearly indicates that plaintiffs
made no attempt to investigate the one element of
importance to them/ which was Van Tassell/s representation that Mrs. Beebe was a good motel operator/ an honest woman/ and that she would pay the
Petersens.
POINT :II THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE
RE:ADY, VviLLING AND ABLE TO ·CANCEL AND
TERlVIINATE THE AGREE.ME.NT BY AND BETWEEN
THE P ARTIE:S.

There is no evidence in the record to support
that portion of Finding of Fact No. 3 which states
that //the plaintiffs of all times have been ready/ willing and able to cancel and terminate said written
agreement by and between the parties/ terminating
anv interest they may have acquired therein and
RETTJRNING THE SAME TO DEFENDANT/I (R 16).
(Emphasis added_.) In fact/ the record shows that the
Petersens did not attempt to protect the interest they
had acquired from Mecham in the Beebe Contract
and simply let it go. Thus/ the Petersens had nothing to return to Mecham/ and the trial court was in
error for including this in Finding of Fact No. 3.
Petersen admitted that he knew that they should
stand togehter to protect Mecham's equity in the
moteL but failed to do. (R 74). Under general prinSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cipals of equity he who seeks equity must do
equi~y. In a suit for rescission of a completed contract, plaintiff must restore defendant to his status
quo. The uncontroverted evidence shows plaintiffs
failed to protect the interest they should have restored to defendant, and consequently were not in
the position to do equity by their ovvn default. Accordingly the court should have denied plaintiffs'
petihon for rescission.
POINT III: THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY
BY THE PLAINTIFFS SHOWS THAT THEY ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT WITH THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS
BY VAN T ASSE.LL WIT I-I RESPECT TO MRS. BEEBE
AND NOT BE.CA.USE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS
AS TO INCOME.

Notwithstanding any representations made to
the Petersens with respect to the income of the
motel while Mecham operated it, the record· shows
thcJ the real basis for the Petersens' entering into
the contract was the representation by Van Tassell
to the Petersens as to the character of Mrs. Zola
Beebe and her ability to operate and manage the
motel in a profitable manner. Mr. Van Tassell had
been negotiating v.rith the Petersens for two months
cr mere to get them to buy the motel (R 73, 88). It
was at this time that the alleged representations as
to the income were made to them. Yet they did not
buy the motel. Thereafter, Zola Beebe bought the
r::otel, and Mrs. Petersen testified that Van Tassell
made representations to them of his prior acquaintance with Mrs. Beebe, together with her ability and
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honesty, whereupon the Petersens bought an interest in the Beebe Contract. Thus it clearly appears
that the fact which motivated the Petersens to "deal"
was Van Tassell's representations about Zola Beebe,
and not about the income of the motel. In fact Mrs.
Petersen admitted this in so many words in the followillg testimony (R 89):
"Q.

He [Van Tassell] did assure you you would be
paid by Mrs. Beebe every month?

"A.

I guess he did, or we wouldn't have signed it."

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that essential
elements of the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are contrary to the evidence,
are not supported by any competence evidenced
and, therefore, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
should be reversed in favor of the defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
TUFT, MARSHALL AND DIBBLE
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
53 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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